The importance of sustained federal funding for public health

Erik Riesdorf of Wisconsin prepares specimens for testing in the laboratory

By Stephanie Barahona, associate specialist, Public Health Preparedness and Response, APHL and Sam Abrams, specialist, Public Health Preparedness and Response, APHL

As hospitals across the country work to manage a constant influx of COVID-19 patients, their partners in public health are addressing critical community and statewide testing needs. While both the healthcare and public health systems are responding to the pandemic, their approach is different: healthcare systems focus on providing individual patient care while public health supports an entire population’s health. In this response, and like many before, the role of the public health laboratory in detecting and responding to threats has never been more critical. But public health laboratories are often only funded when there is a crisis such as Ebola, Zika, vaping and now COVID-19. This approach to federally fund laboratories while in emergency mode leaves the nation vulnerable.

Preparedness funding 101

Although public health laboratories receive funding support from their state and local governments, the federal government provides the majority of their preparedness and response funding. Via the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity for Prevention and Control of Emerging Infectious Diseases Cooperative Agreement (ELC) and the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (PHEP), the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is the primary funder of state, local and territorial public health laboratories. For 25 years, the ELC has been a source of significant financial support that enables public health laboratories to conduct surveillance and respond to vector-borne diseases, food and waterborne diseases and other emerging threats such as pandemic influenza and COVID-19. In Fiscal Year 19 (FY19), which represents August 1, 2019, to July 31, 2020, total ELC funding was approximately $231 million, of which 43% went to public health laboratories to support testing and surveillance needs.

On an annual basis, approximately 90% of funding for public health preparedness and response efforts come from PHEP. Following the anthrax attacks of 2001, total PHEP funding to public health agencies peaked in 2003 at $970 million (unadjusted)—a year in which public health laboratories received $167.7 million for biological and chemical preparedness. Over the years, this funding has decreased considerably. In FY 2019 (July 1, 2019, to June 30, 2020), PHEP funding totaled $620 million. This was similar to 2018 when the jurisdictions received $620 million, of which public health laboratories received $81.5 million (Figure 1).

Figure 1: PHEP Funding to Public Health Laboratories, 1999-2018 (in millions $)

Funding has continued to lag for ELC and PHEP, creating challenges for laboratories to remain adequately prepared. ELC-recipient public health laboratories remain underfunded by 70% in personnel support while laboratory equipment and supplies, which are critical for detecting infectious diseases, face a shortage of 60%. Over 39% of ELC funding requests for health information systems went unfunded in FY19, resulting in $29 million less than health departments needed to sustain syndromic surveillance, electronic laboratory reporting and other systems necessary to track patient cases and limit the disease burden. Cuts to PHEP funding impacted preparedness activities as well. Up to half of state public health laboratories faced cuts over the past few years, resulting in the inability to expand capabilities for new assays and tests and hiring necessary staff.

Staying ahead of emerging threats

Funding shortages are most evident during a public health crisis. The federal government has largely responded to public health emergencies through just-in-time supplemental funding. The 2014 Ebola virus epidemic exposed significant gaps in US operational readiness to respond to a threat of its kind. Congress responded with millions of dollars, of which $110 million went to state, local and territorial health departments via the ELC. Approximately $21 million of these funds were provided to public health laboratories over a three-year period (extended in most cases to four years) to enhance biosafety and biosecurity, infection control and other urgent gaps. By enhancing outreach efforts, public health laboratories were able to engage clinical laboratorians and provide guidance on risk assessments, appropriate use of personal protective equipment, decontamination and other biosafety issues.

When the funding ended in 2018, many public health laboratories were forced to reduce biosafety staff and diminish outreach efforts. This presented challenges to recruiting and maintaining qualified staff as many worried about a subsequent loss of funds. The emergence of Zika proved similar to Ebola, with CDC issuing $97 million in supplemental funding via the ELC.  

Response to COVID-19 is no different. Congress is appropriating billions of dollars and public health agencies now face a surge of funds at the height of a pandemic:

  • At the beginning of the response, CDC redirected funds from its internal activities to state, local and territorial health departments via the Crisis Response Cooperative Agreement.
  • An initial $10 million was distributed to select jurisdictions through the ELC.
  • On March 5, the president signed the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020 (PL 116-123). This act provided funding to prevent, prepare for and respond to COVID-19. By March 16, CDC via the Public Health Crisis Response Cooperative Agreement awarded $569.8 million to 65 jurisdictions. On April 6, another $160 million was awarded to 34 jurisdictions. This included 27 jurisdictions with high COVID-19 case counts or evidence of rapidly accelerating case counts and seven US territories and freely associated states with unique COVID-19 response challenges.
  • In addition, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act, provided billions in supplemental funding, with a total of $631 million awarded via the ELC to state, local and territorial health agencies to increase testing capability and capacity, improve surveillance and additional efforts necessary for the US to successfully combat COVID-19.

Finding long-term solutions

While these additional funding sources are a welcome relief to underfunded public health systems, they do not provide a long-term solution for combating new threats.  With each response, public health is behind—they have no ability to be ready to respond to novel and large-scale threats. This lag limits the ability for public health laboratories to quickly ramp up testing capacity needed to stay ahead.

Consistent and sustainable federal funding for public health laboratories is key to stay ahead of threats. Such funding provides:

  • A warm base where laboratories are poised to quickly and safely respond, which encompasses highly trained laboratory scientists, biosafety professionals and other support personnel; high-throughput equipment and electronic data messaging tools; and communication systems and agreements in place with other laboratories such as commercial laboratories.
  • The opportunity for scientists to validate and verify equipment and assays, ensuring timely, accurate results and sustained confidence in quality laboratory testing.
  • Reagents and other laboratory supplies, including personal protective equipment, so that laboratorians can appropriately and safely perform testing and provide ample capacity within their jurisdictions.
  • A national laboratory system comprised of private and public laboratories working side by side to protect the public’s health.

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APHL, partners garner $550M for data modernization initiative

Image depicting data transfer

Like many aspects of public health, the effective, efficient movement of public health data has been chronically underfunded. Faced with this perpetual issue—combined with a sharp increase in data production from new laboratory techniques that have added great volumes of data to an overburdened system—APHL joined with the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, the National Association of Public Health Statistics and Information Services, and the Health Information and Management Systems Society in 2019 to engage in the first serious effort to secure federal funding for improved handling of public health data.

APHL contributed to the production of materials that quickly and easily explained the problem and urged Congress to provide $1 billion over the next ten years, at a rate of $100 million per year. With these materials in hand, APHL met with interested partners on Capitol Hill to press the case for funding. It also organized a Hill briefing for Congressional staff where subject matter experts, such as APHL member Dr. Joanne Bartkus, presented on the challenges with existing data handling processes. Dr. Anne Schuchat, Principal Deputy Director of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), highlighted these same challenges in virtually every hearing where she testified on public health emergencies.

These educational activities culminated when Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro took up data modernization as one of her key initiatives in the Labor-HHS appropriations bill. Congresswoman DeLauro successfully included the first installment of $100 million for CDC to pursue the data modernization initiative in the Labor-HHS appropriations bill for fiscal year (FY) 2020. This is an unparalleled achievement in the first year of any significant effort, and one made even more remarkable considering that data management is not a particularly trendy or exciting topic.

Though the Senate never produced a Labor-HHS bill for FY 2020, but indicated that it would not accept the House amount of $100 million for data modernization, APHL persevered, continuing to work closely with Senate staff to advance the funding of the data modernization initiative. Ultimately, Congresswoman DeLauro was able to include $50 million in the final version of the bill. The COVID-19 response allowed for an additional $500 million to be directed to data modernization, and it appears that the balance of the $1 billion ($450 million) could be included in the next emergency supplemental funding bill.

APHL continues to pursue additional annual federal funding for the data management initiative, beginning with fiscal year 2021, and production of the required CDC report to Congress detailing how these federal funds will be expended in 2020 and the spend plan for the subsequent nine years.

While APHL looks forward to more nimble response to public health emergencies, such as COVID-19, due to improved public health data management, the association remains energized by the benefits to result from the $550 million already allocated to the data modernization initiative.

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APHL and Partners Urge Emergency Funding to Bolster Novel Coronavirus Response

US Capitol Building

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact: Michelle Forman, 240.485.2793

Silver Spring, MD — In a letter to the White House and Congress, the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) and partners today requested supplemental appropriations to expand and strengthen public health capacity and coordination in response to the novel coronavirus outbreak.

“While it is too early to reliably predict the additional cost burden and supplemental needs of the COVID-19 response … we anticipate that an initial supplemental is warranted to respond to public health agencies’ critical need to rapidly detect changes and control the outbreak,” the organizations wrote.

The groups outline several urgent priorities, including funding for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to support preparedness and response activities; an appropriation for the relevant offices and programs under the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund; and authority to reimburse uncompensated care for state and local costs, including obtaining and maintaining quarantine and isolation housing capacity and providing wraparound services.

“We are in the midst of a developing public health emergency,” said Scott Becker, CEO of APHL. “Our request identifies initial needs to bolster our response, but it is likely only the start. Public health laboratories and other critical agencies will need sustained funding to address this growing challenge and other public health threats.”

The letter was signed by APHL, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, the National Association of County and City Health Officials and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists.

# # #

The Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) works to strengthen laboratory systems serving the public’s health in the U.S. and globally. APHL’s member laboratories protect the public’s health by monitoring and detecting infectious and foodborne diseases, environmental contaminants, terrorist agents, genetic disorders in newborns and other diverse health threats. Learn more at www.aphl.org.

 

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APHL: President Trump’s FY 2019 budget request is “disheartening and disappointing”

APHL: President Trump’s FY 2019 budget request is “disheartening and disappointing” | www.APHLblog.org

APHL: President Trump’s FY 2019 budget request is “disheartening and disappointing” | www.APHLblog.org

The Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) is very concerned about the decline in federal funding for public health functions such as detection, surveillance and response in the administration’s budget for fiscal year 2019. “It is extremely disheartening and disappointing to see such severe cuts to public health programs at CDC, HRSA, USAID and the Department of State at a time when the services they support are most in need,” said Scott Becker, executive director of APHL. “What is more, these cuts to public health funding come after a historic bipartisan agreement between Congress and the White House to increase federal spending overall for the next two years.”

CDC cuts include:

HRSA cuts include:

Global Health Programs:

  • $1.26 billion cut to Department of State Global Health Programs which includes funding provided to CDC for PEPFAR; and
  • $1.11 billion cut to USAID Global Health Programs.

While the majority of the president’s budget proposal is grim for public health, there were a few areas that are not as dark. APHL was pleased to see that the budget request designates $175 million to CDC to address the growing opioid crisis. Additionally, funding for the Global Disease Detection Program would increase by $51 million and funding for the Public Health Emergency Preparedness program would increase by $4.5 million.

As Scott Becker explained, “The director of the president’s Office of Management and Budget said, ‘the budget is a messaging document.’ In that case, the message to the American people seems to be, ‘Good luck if there is an outbreak or other public health emergency because federal early warning and response programs won’t be there to help you through.’”

APHL will continue work with Congress to assure that funding levels continue at the much-higher amounts provided in previous years. Adequate levels of federal support for state and local laboratory contributions are critical to the nation’s public health security.

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APHL responds to “banned words,” remains focused on CDC’s budget

APHL responds to “banned words,” remains focused on CDC’s budget | www.APHLblog.org

By Scott J. Becker, executive director, APHL

Recent news concerning limits on language permissible in CDC budgetary communications has drawn considerable attention in the media. As a longstanding partner of CDC, APHL shares its commitment to science-based work to protect the public’s health and improve its health status. We are heartened by CDC Director Fitzgerald’s statement that CDC remains committed to evidence-based work described using all appropriate language, and we are confident that CDC will continue to serve all communities, including those most vulnerable and diverse.

Our primary focus is on ensuring that CDC receives funding that will enable APHL members – local, state and territorial public health laboratories – to do the vital work necessary to detect and respond to public health threats. We feel strongly that, while the words CDC uses in their budget submission are extremely important, the funding levels are at least equally deserving of our attention.

We look forward to working with the Administration and Congress to ensure the best scientific evidence is used in all public health decision making and that all public health professionals are able to use language that appropriately conveys the public health policies and programs that allow for improvement for the health of our nation.

You can also read Scott Becker’s letter to the editor of The Washington Post on this matter.

 

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5 New Buzzwords Borrowed From Biology

I’ve just finished revising the latest edition of my human genetics textbook, and while checking the glossary, discovered several potential new buzzwords, a few particularly relevant in these strange times. THE OLD Co-opting terms from

Could funding cuts to food safety programs make you sick?

By Michelle Forman, senior media specialist, APHL

Could funding cuts to food safety programs make you sick? | www.aphlblog.orgWhen public health works, no one sees it.

That’s a common adage at APHL and is most frequently used when referring to the gross lack of – and ever plummeting – funding for valuable public health programs. But what does it mean? When do we see public health and when does it vanish into the background?

The public health system comprises many areas from healthy eating to smoking cessation to biomonitoring to newborn screening. To answer this question, we’re going to focus on food safety – something that impacts every person in the United States – by following the journey of peanuts as they pass through the food system and into your lunch bag.

(Note: Peanuts were chosen to make a point. They are not inherently risky. As of the original date of this post, there is no current known outbreak associated with peanuts. This journey could feature any food item.)

Our peanuts were grown on a large farm that distributes its harvests for use in many different products.

After being roasted, they are shipped to another facility to be ground into a paste. That paste is then used to make peanut butter for cookies, crackers, ice cream, dog treats and many other products.

In a perfect situation, our peanuts are grown using the safest growing practices; thoroughly roasted to kill pathogens acquired on the farm; processed in facilities that ensure utmost safety and cleanliness in accordance with all food safety guidance provided to them; sent to stores, restaurants and other food service facilities where they will be purchased and consumed by families trusting that they are receiving peanut butter crackers free of Salmonella. Public health has worked in the form of inspectors, guidelines, regulations, sample testing, quality assurance, staff training and public education to ensure that a perfect situation can and will exist most of the time. Although you never saw public health working to prevent you from getting sick, it was there.

Even when all goes right – even when there are not blatant safety oversights along the way – sneaky Salmonella can find its way in. What then?

Our peanuts have picked up Salmonella after roasting (there’s likely no more heating to kill that nasty pathogen) in the processing facility. They are then mixed with more and more peanuts, shipments from other farms, passing through machine after machine, being ground into peanut paste, infecting huge lots of peanuts along the way. Our peanuts are now causing a silent outbreak deep within the processing facility.

The lots of infected peanut paste – soon to be peanut butter – go unsuspected and are sent to the next phase of processing where they will become cookies, crackers, ice cream, dog treats, etc.

Suzy Public loves peanut butter cookies, so she picks up a package during a routine grocery store visit. Two days later, Suzy is very sick.

Vomiting takes a turn to more severe symptoms so Suzy does the right thing and heads to her doctor. In keeping with clinical care guidelines, Suzy’s doctor orders a stool sample which is then sent to a clinical lab where it tests positive for Salmonella. This is obviously important information for Suzy’s doctor who needs to determine the most effective treatment, but it is also important for the public at large, especially for those in her community.

Additional testing at the public health laboratory could link Suzy’s Salmonella to other cases in her area or across the country.

While clinical labs must submit a report alerting epidemiologists of Suzy’s Salmonella, many states don’t require clinical labs to submit isolates (a sample of the Salmonella that made Suzy sick) to the public health lab. The report allows epidemiologists to gather initial exposure information on cases, but identifying potential outbreaks among sporadic cases can be tough without additional information. An isolate allows the public health lab to subtype or get DNA fingerprints from the Salmonella (more on this below), providing greater information and more rapid outbreak detection. So why wouldn’t states require these isolates be submitted? There are likely different reasons for this; one common reason is simply that the states lack resources. Some states can afford to have a courier pick up and deliver those isolates, but not every state is able. It is hard to mandate that the clinical labs handle shipments on their own time and dime. Additionally, some states simply cannot process all of those isolates at their current funding level. Requiring all clinical labs to send those isolates would put an enormous workload on already understaffed public health laboratories.

Once the investigation has been opened, an epidemiologist or public health nurse will contact Suzy Public to begin the investigation to nab the culprit. The first question they will ask Suzy is to list everything she consumed in the week or so prior to getting sick. These interviews allow disease detectives to track patterns in sick individuals’ diets. If everyone ate peanut butter crackers, they can target their investigation.

Could funding cuts to food safety programs make you sick? | www.aphlblog.org

Delays in testing or reporting will delay these disease detectives, and that means Suzy and the others who were made ill may not remember so far back. Even if they do remember and the disease detectives can identify a common food item in their diets, that product may already be off the shelves and in more people’s homes thus exacerbating the outbreak. Additionally, departments of public health face staff shortages that mean overloaded epidemiologists and public health nurses. Their ability to conduct thorough interviews requires ample time – and time is limited when staff are carrying a workload suited for several people.

If that isolate was sent to the public health lab, additional testing is done to confirm Salmonella and to subtype the pathogen. There are over 2,500 subtypes of Salmonella, so the first step in outbreak detection is determining which type has made this individual sick. PFGE testing delves further into the identification of the pathogen by identifying its DNA fingerprint. For example, there could be multiple outbreaks associated with Salmonella Typhimurium at the same time but that doesn’t mean it is the same culprit. Isolating the DNA fingerprints is like a detective pulling fingerprints from a crime scene – when there are multiple offenses committed, fingerprints can link them to the same perpetrator. The DNA fingerprints are then entered into the PulseNet database, a system used to detect clusters nationally. This information is used by epidemiologists to further target their investigation.

But staff shortages in public health laboratories mean not all isolates can be tested, and those that are tested could be delayed. That means less information is making its way into the PulseNet database or it is being entered too late.

Delays or gaps in information make the investigation extremely difficult.

The case of the contaminated peanuts is a complicated one. We know the contaminated peanut butter used to make Suzy’s cookies caused her illness, but identifying those cookies as the source is only the beginning of the investigative process. Was it the flour, sugar, salt, eggs, peanuts, or one or more of the other ingredients that made Suzy sick? And what about the people who were sickened by peanut butter crackers? Or energy bars? Finding the common denominator – and drilling all the way down to where contamination occurred – is very difficult. These complicated investigations can last upwards of a year, but they are being closed without resolution simply because public health departments don’t have the means to keep them open. No resolution means contamination at the processing facility could continue and more people could become ill. It also means the rest of the industry cannot learn from the outbreak and implement changes to improve product safety.

Rapid detection leads to faster recalls of contaminated products. That means fewer people get sick. But our public health system does not have the means to investigate every case of foodborne illness. There are not enough resources to follow up on every cluster.

Without question, more outbreaks would be found if there were sufficient resources to detect and investigate them all. Simply put, funding cuts are ultimately causing more people to get sick.

Advocates continue to work hard to convince decision makers that increasing funding for the public health system is a very good investment in our population. Healthy people are better for every aspect of society. While the advocates are working, public health professionals continue to seek more ways to improve the system with fewer staff and fewer resources. Whole genome sequencing, for example, could provide more information to better understand outbreak clusters, and that could mean less follow up testing which could mean operating with fewer staff. However, implementation of advancements such as whole genome sequencing requires time and money that the system simply does not have.

Every day that you wake up without foodborne illness, thank the public health system. Waking up healthy did not happen without the dedicated men and women working hard to prevent the spread of dangerous bacteria.

When public health works, no one sees it… but it still needs adequate support to continue protecting our health. The disease identification system described above operates on only $40 million annually and is in immediate need of at least an additional $10 million as indicated in the 2015 budget request. To realize significant improvements, CDC funding for food safety should be doubled at a minimum.

Tell Congress that more money is needed for food safety! Follow these two simple steps:

  1. Here is a letter telling Congress that more funding is needed for public health. Complete the information and it will be sent to your elected officials.
  2. Copy the following sentence and paste it into the letter to draw attention to the specific needs for food safety: I am especially concerned with the need for funding to improve our nation’s food safety system. CDC’s food safety office is in immediate need of an additional $10 million as indicated in the 2015 budget request. Without this funding, more Americans will get sick from foodborne illness.

 

 

MERS-CoV: Why We Are Not Panicking

By Tyler Wolford, Specialist, Laboratory Response NetworkPublic Health Preparedness and Response Program; and Stephanie Chester, Senior Specialist, Influenza Program, Infectious Disease Program, APHL

MERS-CoV: Why We Are Not Panicking | www.aphlblog.orgBy now you have probably heard that CDC has confirmed two cases of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV) infection in the US. Both were imported from Saudi Arabia; travelers became sick on their journey and sought care here in the US. This is the kind of stuff that typically gets us, infectious disease and preparedness folks, amped up, reaching for coffee and telling our loved ones we might be working late. We know that MERS-CoV is a serious infection – as of mid-May 2014, there have been 536 laboratory-confirmed cases and 145 deaths of MERS-CoV. However, the laboratory community is accustomed to responding to these situations—and that’s good news for public health. We have written, tested and rewritten preparedness plans, policies and procedures for dealing with novel and/or unexpected events and pathogens. We have dealt with white powders (more times than we can count), influenza A(H3N2)v, re-emerging vaccine preventable diseases and many other threats. In addition, we were given a lengthy (roughly two-year) heads-up with MERS-CoV. And while we know not to expect this luxury every time (we’re looking at you, 2009 H1N1 pandemic), the lead time meant that CDC, public health laboratories, health departments and clinicians were alerted and prepared well before the first US two cases occurred. Efforts by CDC and the public health labs ensured that, when the first cases arrived, they could be rapidly identified so proper precautions and epidemiologic investigations could begin. What are the reasons for our relative calmness despite the arrival of MERS-CoV on our shores? We were – and still are – prepared as the case count mounted on the other side of the Atlantic. Here are the specifics:

  • Planning. MERS-CoV was first reported in 2012 in Saudi Arabia. Once transmission became sustained in the Middle East, public health officials knew it was likely that a case would arrive in the US: we just didn’t know when. We had time to plan our response.
  • An approved test. CDC rapidly developed a real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) test which was granted emergency use authorization (EUA) by the FDA on June 5, 2013, and deployed the same month to 44 state public health laboratories and one local public health laboratory.
  • Infrastructure. The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) provided critical infrastructure for rapid distribution of the MERS-CoV test to public health laboratories across the US.
  • Training. Once laboratories received the test, they trained their staff and completed proficiency testing to demonstrate that they were trained and ready to perform testing should the need arise.
  • Experience. With health departments and physicians on alert, over 150 patients with MERS associated symptoms have been tested using the CDC assay. All were found to be negative.  This testing provided valuable opportunities for laboratories to familiarize themselves with the test.
  • Communication. CDC, APHL and other partner organizations have maintained timely communications with states, and others partners to keep everyone abreast of the current situation.
  • Dedication. Our public health labs are full of amazing scientists who are willing to spend countless hours, seven days a week to ensure rapid test results.

So if we aren’t panicking now that we have MERS-CoV cases in the US, what are we doing? We’re sprinting to keep pace with MERS-CoV and so far we have performed well, managing every step in the process with precision.

  • Indiana promptly notified CDC of a presumptive positive MERS-CoV infection and CDC rapidly confirmed this result.
  • CDC and Indiana started epidemiologic investigations and tested samples from close contacts of the infected patient.
  • APHL and CDC began communications immediately after the first case was confirmed.
  • APHL, in collaboration with CDC, held a laboratory alert call on May 6, 2014, to provide state and local public health labs with a situational update and to review laboratory testing guidance.
  • Currently CDC is distributing new proficiency testing panels so labs can refresh their competency on the CDC MERS-CoV test.

MERS-CoV is a serious threat that deserves the highest level of preparedness and attention.  Fortunately for the American public, we in the public health system are poised to handle MERS-CoV and other health threats whenever, wherever and however they enter our country. This is why we aren’t panicking, but it’s also why public health requires steady support.  Pathogens have no regard for budgets, funding cycles or economic trends. They won’t wait, and neither can we.